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Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research Programme (A4EA) 
In a world shaped by rapid change, the Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research programme 
focuses on fragile, conflict and violence affected settings to ask how social and political action for empowerment 
and accountability emerges in these contexts, what pathways it takes, and what impacts it has. 
 
A4EA is implemented by a consortium consisting of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), the 
Accountability Research Center (ARC), the Collective for Social Science Research (CSSR), the Institute of 
Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), Itad, Oxfam GB, and the Partnership for African Social and 
Governance Research (PASGR). Research focuses on five countries: Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan. A4EA is funded by UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed in this publication do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of our funder. 
 
For more information, visit www.ids.ac.uk/A4EA  
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Executive Summary  
 ‘If we had had to stick to the original plan, we would have shut by now.’ (Victoria 
Lihiru, I4ID’s Democratic Governance & Strategic Partnerships Manager) 
This case study forms part of a research project1 to examine whether and how adaptive approaches 
can strengthen aid projects promoting empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict and 
violence-affected settings (FCVAS). The research examines some of the assertions around the adaptive 
management approach and explores if and how adaptive approaches, including rapid learning and 
planning responses (fast feedback loops and agile programming) are particularly relevant and useful 
for E&A in FCVAS. 
 
Each case study focuses on a large DfID governance project, in this case the Institutions for Inclusive 
Development (I4ID), a five-year initiative in Tanzania funded by UKAid (£10m) and IrishAid (£1.6m). 
I4ID is managed by Palladium, and involves a consortium including ODI, SNV, BBC Media Action and 
(initially) Global Partners Governance.  
 
Mechanisms of Adaptive Management 
Adaptive Management involves a dynamic interaction between 3 elements: delivery, programming 
and governance. 
 
Adaptive Delivery (AD): Frontline staff think on their feet, continuously navigating through ever-
changing, turbulent conditions, many moving parts and players, ambiguity and uncertainty. They come 
up with best guesses on what to do next, then test and correct in a continuous engagement and 
learning process.  
 
Adaptive Programming (AP) is a more conscious and structured process, usually in the hands of the 
senior management within the project office. It involves less frequent cycles of reflection, often 
bringing in critical allies to help question and challenge to identify new directions and opportunities.  
 
Adaptive Governance (AG) normally resides with the officer(s) in the donor agency responsible for the 
project. They must manage upwards, coping with donors’ inevitable pressures for results, reporting 
and shifting priorities, and manage downwards, ensuring that the project accounts for how it is 
spending donor money, but also retains the freedom of manoeuvre that lies at the heart of adaptive 
management.  
  
                                                             
1 See https://www.ids.ac.uk/programme-and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-a4ea/ 
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Figure 1:  Relationship between AD, AP and AG when things are going well. 
Figure 1 captures the relationship between AD, AP and AG when things are going well. In practice, it is constantly evolving 
and often fraught. Players in all three roles are under pressure and must face in two directions at once. The basic currency 
of adaptive management is trust between the various players and tiers evolved. 
 
Figure 2:  When adaptive approaches work well. 
 
In its first two years, I4ID has seen an evolving dance between these three elements, including periods of both success and 
crisis, captured in the graphic below 
Example of initial success, enabled by trust:  
An entrepreneurial and well-networked women’s rights activist in I4ID spotted a potential ‘quick win’: 
VAT on menstrual products. Exemption would reduce the wholesale price by 18% at a stroke, paving 
the way for increased demand. Left to get on with it, she worked with women’s organizations to win 
the support of women MPs and the Ministries of Health and Education, who agreed to take it to the 
real decision maker – the Ministry of Finance. The MoF checked how much it would cost, found it to 
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be small (due to the low levels of demand) and signed off. Now that the tax has been removed, I4ID is 
working with manufacturers and distributors to develop the market by tackling other obstacles, 
especially to access by low-income women. 
 
Figure 3:  When adaptive approaches do not work well 
 
Example of initial costs in the absence of trust:  
In the first year of the programme, Palladium and early phase staff had to invest considerable time in 
developing an extensive Theory of Change. They felt frustrated by the focus on getting the thinking 
right without being able to start experimenting and testing the waters to identify options and alliances. 
Not only did this original approach of overthinking the strategy delay the start to the learning by doing 
that lies at the heart of AM, it also led to an overambitious ToC that had to be readjusted considerably 
as I4ID got to grips with the on-the-ground complexity. In the words of Sachin Gupta: ‘The idea that 
you can predict your theory of change contradicts the need for purposive muddling to figure stuff out 
as you go and deepen understanding of the complexity.’ 
The Magufuli Political Shock 
Politics intervened soon after I4ID was conceived, overturning DFID’s assumption that Tanzania was a 
relatively stable, predictable environment in which to experiment with adaptive management. In 
October 2015, just after the project was put out to tender, John Magufuli won the presidential 
elections. A strong authoritarian tendency in the new government soon became clear in a gradual, 
and seemingly inexorable, tightening of political and civic space. 
 
For I4ID, the timing could hardly have been worse given its primary focus on inclusive institutions. A 
fledgling project was knocked sideways before it was even up and running. A major strategic rethink 
in January 2018 scaled back direct work on Democratic Governance in favour of a focus on issue-based 
work, in areas such as solid waste, menstrual health and disability education. 
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National v International Identity 
DFID increasingly implements AM through relatively large (£10-£100m) projects run in-country by 
private management contractors, with headquarters in OECD countries. On the plus side, contractors 
can build up a body of AM expertise, and learn between countries. They find it easier than more 
bureaucratic, process-heavy organizations, such as governments or large INGOs, to spot operational 
problems (e.g. under-performing staff) early on and deal with them swiftly, for example by bringing in 
new leadership when projects go off track.  
 
On the negative side, they have shallow roots (if any) in-country, which can mean they lack the political 
antennae that are vital for adaptive management, or a commitment to grow those national roots 
beyond the lifetime of the project. 
 
Contractors rely heavily on foreign consultants and experts. Over time, I4ID has seen a shift in staffing 
from foreign-dominated to largely Tanzanian staff, but the local/foreign balance of consultants has 
been much harder to shift.  
 
Ongoing reliance on non-Tanzanians, while ensuring an influx of new ideas and cross-fertilization from 
other contexts, can detract from investing in a politically grounded perspective and a Tanzanian 
knowledge base that endures after the project ends in 2021. 
Partnership 
Partnership with local organizations is an essential guarantor of impact, legitimacy and sustainability 
(local organizations will be around long after the programme has closed its doors). But Adaptive 
Management approaches appear to be a double-edged sword in terms of building long-term 
partnerships based on trust. On the one hand, AM approaches allow I4ID to be responsive to the shifts 
in local context and the emerging needs of local organizations for small grants, technical assistance 
etc. On the other hand, if the restlessness inherent in AM leads to a ‘chop and change’ approach 
between the programme and local partners, then it can be experienced as a lack of commitment by 
them, which can undermine trust. At the very least, it is important that Adaptively Managed 
programmes explain their decisions, and preferably include local partners in making them. 
Nailing down the USP 
In the aid-rich context of Tanzania, what is the ‘unique selling point’ of I4ID’s adaptive management 
approach? This question tugs at I4ID’s senior leadership. Without a clear USP, why should Tanzanian 
organisations listen to or want to work with I4ID? And why would donors continue to invest so much 
in this way of working?  
 
The USP for donors is perhaps the most straightforward – an experiment in a popular new way of 
doing governance programming, involving globally recognized (usually non-Tanzanian) heavyweights, 
that might unlock untapped development potential on novel topics.  
 
The USP among Tanzanian institutions is more elusive, but includes: 
 
Agile money to catalyse local efforts: AM projects can be sources of small, quick money in a sector 
where big, slow money is the norm – and since they are small, they are more likely to catalyse 
entrepreneurial ventures, rather than displace them with a ‘doing for’ approach 
 
Convening and brokering: AM projects like I4ID often seek to convene/broker new cross-sectoral 
coalitions, needed for breaking through impasses, innovation and scaling up impact. 
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Responsive Technical Assistance: I4ID can rapidly identify and hire experts to provide evidence and 
guidance. 
Closing Spaces, Inclusion and Working with the Grain 
I4ID’s approach raises questions about the limits to ‘working with the grain’ of power when the 
political space is closing. At what point does working within the confines of formal power become 
incompatible with inclusion and/or development? When/how should AM approaches shift to working 
against the grain?  
Monitoring/Evaluation/ Learning and Outcomes 
While it is too early for detailed insights into I4ID’s outcomes, in the form of concrete benefits to 
Tanzanian citizens, two related questions will be important from a MEL perspective. 
  
Given the constraining environment, might it be acceptable to simply keep spaces open or stop even 
worse things from happening? Donors rank achievements of key goals of the projects they fund, 
including in I4ID’s case the goal of ‘democratic engagement’. This might show as a lower ranking in 
the metric used to assess democratic engagement. Will such a lower ranking be acceptable to team 
leadership and donors, if the political space tightens further – even if that is what is most useful and 
feasible in such a context?  
 
How to balance reporting and reflecting?  AM needs reporting for three reasons: upward 
accountability, for team reflections, and for sharing learning.  But there is a trade-off between creating 
a heavy upward reporting burden and encouraging the kind of (documented) reflection useful for 
‘learning by doing’. At I4ID, we were struck by the vast amounts of upward reporting of this very young 
project but noted that the balance between reflection and reporting was still evolving. Documentation 
for use by peers and not necessarily upwardly-focussed is also critical for explaining why subtle 
adaptations are needed, raising questions about the theory of change or action, and retrospectively 
spotting patterns of what works or not.  
Timing and Pressure for Results 
Adaptive management must strike a tricky balance between allowing enough room to try, change and 
scale different approaches and being accountable to its donors for programme outcomes. 
 
This pressure creates four potential unintended consequences. Firstly, it can exacerbate the 
operational default of contractors to reach for established, usually international, experts, rather than 
invest the time needed to nurture local capacity. Secondly, it can accentuate risk aversion, as the 
project shies away from the politically (increasingly) difficult towards a search for politically easier 
terrain, such as market strengthening. Thirdly, the need to show potential for impact can reduce staff 
appetite for risk. Finally, it requires balancing the ‘quick wins’ to build morale and momentum, and 
keeping the project focused on impact at scale.  
Conclusion  
This study complements the other two papers in this series, on Pyoe Pin in Myanmar, and PERL in 
Nigeria, in three important ways. Firstly, it confirms, and further elaborates, the value of subdividing 
the broad concept of ‘adaptive management’ into its component parts – adaptive governance, 
programming and delivery.  
 
9 
 
Secondly, whereas Pyoe Pin and PERL are the result of over a decade of experimentation and learning, 
I4ID is still an infant. Seeing how it is finding its adaptive feet provides useful insights into what to 
expect in the initial months and years of future Adaptive Management projects.  
 
Thirdly, it shows how a fledgling AM project responds to a serious political shock that forced it into a 
fundamental rethink of its approach. And how being allowed to be adaptive was essential to its 
survival and ability to deliver. 
Purpose of the Case Study  
Fragile, conflict and violence-affected settings (FCVAS) are messy and ambiguous contexts in which to 
plan and implement development initiatives. This is particularly true when these interventions are 
designed to stimulate or support citizen empowerment and government accountability (E&A) – since 
there remains considerable uncertainty over which E&A interventions work, where and why2. 
Consequently, external actors are increasingly adopting an adaptive approach to E&A programming. 
This involves a compass rather than map approach, in which real-time political economy analysis, 
programme monitoring and evidence informed learning, are used in shorter-than-usual planning 
cycles to maintain strategic direction. Arguably, this both reduces risk and maximises opportunity. 
This case study forms part of a research project to examine some of the assertions around the adaptive 
programming approach and to explore if and how adaptive approaches, including rapid learning and 
planning responses (fast feedback loops and agile programming) are particularly relevant and useful 
for E&A in FCVAS. Each case study focuses on a large DfID governance project, as identified from a 
desk review of relevant literature.  According to this literature, the adaptive programming approach – 
because of the rapid learning involved - enables an evolutionary cycle of variation, selection and 
amplification of intervention experiments to trigger pathways of change that would otherwise not be 
achievable. 
Within each case study, we examine the evidence of how this iterative process works and whether it 
leads (or is likely to lead) to enhanced development outcomes.  We focus on the learning component 
of adaptive programming, firstly, to determine if and how the approach has enabled a better 
understanding of real-world opportunities and barriers and connected the programme’s evolving 
theory of action to a real-world theory of change to generate better development results. Secondly, 
we seek to determine if and how real-time political economy analysis and programme monitoring 
approaches, are dependent on front-line workers3 and the extent to which they play a part in 
embedding local knowledge into programme decision making. To better understand both the barriers 
and the enablers to adaptive programming, we use the case studies to deepen our understanding of 
the sources of inertia and opposition (ideas, interests, institutions etc) to adaptive programming and 
to explain whether and why these approaches have been difficult to adopt and/or implement.  
 
Box 1: Some Adaptive Management terminology 
Acknowledging uncertainty and complexity in development has led to an emphasis on rapid 
feedback loops to connect knowledge-gathering to learning and decision-making in order to 
facilitate adaptation to changing circumstances and enhanced understanding. 
                                                             
2 Itad, 2016, Macro Evaluation of DFID’s Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability. Empowerment and 
Accountability Annual Technical Report: What Works for Social Accountability. Final version, 2016. 
3 This term is used to describe a project employee who deals directly with beneficiaries or who is directly involved in 
delivering project activities. 
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An agile programme is one which is adaptive, iterative and highly sensitive to performance metrics 
throughout implementation. The shift to agile is based on the notion that it is not possible to design 
solutions to complex problems: they can only be solved by adaptation and iteration. 
The authors distinguish between a theory of action and a theory of change. A theory of action sets 
out the strategy and tactics to be adopted for an intervention by a given organisation to explain how 
the intervention will achieve the outcomes expected. 
A theory of change sets out a hypothesis for how change might happen in any given system4.  
In practice however, many organizations elide the two, glossing rapidly over how the system is 
changing, to an ‘it’s all about us’ focus on the intervention. This can easily lead to exaggerating the 
likely impact of a given programme, and a lack of awareness about the drivers of change/inertia 
within the system. 
 
Each case study has been shaped by questions that examine how adaptive programming relates to 
the context in which programming occurs, the mechanisms through which programming is delivered 
and the outcomes achieved.  Questions include:  
 How do contextual factors suggest the need for, enable or constrain adaptive management?  
 What are the mechanisms and strategies employed for adaptive management – what do they add 
and how do they work? In particular, how far has programme design enabled front-line workers 
to engage in regular analysis of power and political dynamics surrounding the programme and 
what kinds of learning, adaptation, issues and solutions do they lead to in practice?   
 What is different about the type and nature of outcomes achieved by adaptive management vs 
non-adaptive? Do adaptive approaches enable external actors to achieve better E&A outcomes? 
What is the nature of the flexibility and adaptiveness that is needed in FCVAS and how far do 
donor practices support this? 
When observations and conclusions of all case studies are synthesised, it is hoped that lessons will 
inform both explicitly adaptive and more traditional donor programming, by formulating suggestions 
which help shape programme design, contracting, real-time monitoring and learning and programme 
management arrangements. 
The choice of Tanzania for this third case study is unusual, as Tanzania is not generally considered 
either fragile or conflict-affected. It was selected for three reasons: firstly, initial attempts to visit AM 
programmes in Pakistan and DRC came to nothing due to the difficulties of obtaining visas and other 
permissions within the tight timeline of the research and contextual difficulties such as elections, an 
issue to which we return in the synthesis paper about the three case studies. Secondly, Tanzania is 
illuminating as an example of what happens to an AM programme – and because of it – when political 
space suddenly starts to close, as it has done since President Magufuli’s election in 2015. Third, I4ID 
provides valuable insights into the early years of an AM programme, whereas the Myanmar and 
Nigeria case studies involved programmes already over a decade old. 
  
                                                             
4 See D. Green, Theories of Change for Promoting Empowerment and Accountability in Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
Settings, IDS, 2017 and A. Christie and R. Burge, The Role of External Actors in Supporting Social and Political Action 
towards Empowerment and Accountability with a Focus on Fragile, Conflict- and Violence-Affected Settings 
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1 Introduction to Adaptive Management 
Following a sustained critique of previous approaches to aid that were characterized as over-
prescriptive and linear5, a series of networks and initiatives have in recent years explored ways of 
‘doing development differently’. Most discussion and experimentation has taken place in the field of 
governance and institutional reform, but discussions have spilled over into other sectors such as 
health and education. 
While there are nuances and differences, the multiple threads, with names like ‘Adaptive 
Management’, ‘Thinking and Working Politically’, ‘Doing Development Differently’ and ‘Problem 
Driven Iterative Adaptation’ exhibit enough common ground for one practitioner to describe it as a 
‘second orthodoxy’6. This contrasts with a ‘first orthodoxy’ that tends to lock in inputs, outputs and 
outcomes from the start in a rigid design, as we’’ as charting a linear course towards a given ‘solution’. 
By contrast, common features of the new orthodoxy are: 
• Context is everything: political economy analysis is central, and not just at planning stage. 
• Best fit, not best practice: aid programmes need to ‘work with the grain’ of local institutions, 
rather than import solutions from elsewhere.  
• From blueprint to flexible, responsive, adaptive programming: Rather than conduct all analysis 
and design ex ante, aid programmes should accept that their initial design can only ever be a best 
guess and build in the capability to learn from experience and adapt accordingly.  
• Real-time learning: this requires feedback loops being put in place that allow programmes to learn 
and adapt as they go, rather than simply evaluate at the end of the programme cycle.  
• Long-term commitment: this kind of ‘learning by doing’ is ill suited to short programme cycles. 
Most success stories take a decade or more to show significant impact at scale. 
 
We need to acknowledge our own biases. Both authors are predisposed to an interpretation of both 
development and adaptive management that privileges civil society, bottom up processes, 
participation and radical social change. This puts us at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
version of adaptive management that stresses technical approaches to ‘doing development 
differently’, such as rapid feedback loops, flexible pivots, responsiveness to change, responsiveness to 
early signs of success/commitment, reading weak signals, systems understanding, complexity theory, 
portfolio approaches, prototyping and iteration, but are often naïve about the systems of power and 
politics within which these formulaic building blocks are expected to work. I4ID appears to be pursuing 
a form of adaptive management that is closer to this latter understanding, which helps explain some 
of our reflections. 
  
                                                             
5 See for Example Easterly, White Man’s Burden (Oxford, OUP, 2007), Andrews, Limits to Institutional Reform in Development 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2013) or Levy, Working with the Grain, (Oxford, OUP, 2014)  
6 https://abtassocgovernancesoapbox.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/abt-associates-working-paper-series-issue-no-1-final-
010617.pdf  
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2 An Introduction to I4ID and Why Context is King 
‘We are not unique, but we are unusual, more agile, quicker, broader set of 
options’ [Helen Barnes, Governance Advisor and I4ID Senior Responsible Officer, 
DFID] 
 
‘If we had had to stick to the original plan, we would have shut by now’ (Victoria 
Lihiru, I4ID’s Democratic Governance & Strategic Partnerships Manager) 
 
The Institutions for Inclusive Development (I4ID) programme’s goal is to work with the Tanzanian 
government, representative institutions, civil society and the private sector to strengthen institutions 
in Tanzania to become more inclusive and accountable so that economic growth and services bring 
more benefits to poor and marginalized people.7 I4ID is a five year project funded by UKAid (£10m) 
and IrishAid (£1.6m) and running until 2021. 
 
I4ID was deliberately designed to test out new approaches to institutional reform. According to DFID’s 
Nick Leader, DFID Tanzania Governance Team Leader, who was involved from the start: 
 
‘We wanted a political governance-type programme. In 2014/15 a lot of these adaptive management 
ideas were current. It’s easier for DFID to experiment in more stable contexts like Tanzania. The big 
shift was away from working on particular institutions to working on problems – identifying particular 
problems, then bringing together whoever is involved in solving it.’ 
 
The winning consortium (described as ‘fantastic’ by Nick Leader), was led by Palladium, and included 
ODI, SNV, BBC Media Action and Global Partners Governance. One I4ID staff member describe its 
strengths as ‘Palladium is good on funding and management; SNV is good on community facilitation; 
BBC Media Action is good on media issues; ODI on research.’ We were struck by the absence of   
indigenous Tanzanian organizations in the winning bid, although SNV and BBC Media Action have long 
track records in the country. DfID was similarly struck by the absence of Tanzanians, although it 
focused more on individuals in the team than on organisations – a balance that has improved over 
time. 
 
I4ID’s initial Theory of Action is captured in figure 3, taken from Palladium’s winning tender. It focused 
on two strands: (1) building democratic institutions and (2) active and informed citizens through a 
mixture of issue-based dialogue and capacity building. The two strands were intended to provide entry 
points and supporting activities to the main work, which was to be the engagement of stakeholders 
on collective action projects on specific development issues. An important element of the design is a 
belief that people tend not to mobilise around abstract concepts like democratic institutions or citizen 
interlocutors, but rather around real tangible issues like water, power, health, education. In theory, 
both strands have been integrated into the issue-specific workstreams. In practice, political changes 
and tightening constraints may well reduce what is achievable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 Sunflower Workstream Theory of Change, p.1, 14th July 2017 
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Figure 4:  Initial I4ID Theory of Action 
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Figure 5: I4ID Programme Timeline 
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The Magufuli Political Shock 
Politics intervened soon after I4ID was conceived, overturning DFID’s assumption that Tanzania was a 
relatively stable, predictable environment in which to experiment with adaptive management. In 
October 2015, just after the programme was put out to tender, John Magufuli won the presidential 
elections. 
While the initial reaction was widespread excitement over his promises to crack down on corruption, 
a strong authoritarian streak in the new government soon became clear. It was not a single moment, 
like a military coup, but a gradual, and seemingly inexorable, tightening of political and civic space, 
enshrined both in presidential pronouncements and accompanying policy making and legislation. Over 
the following months, a crackdown on traditional and social media followed, along with: harassment 
of opponents; a de facto ban on public rallies and the end of public broadcasting of parliamentary 
proceedings; temporary bans on newspapers; arrests, court proceedings and tax investigations into 
prominent political and business leaders; and suspicious and unexplained disappearances, shootings 
and killings8. Tellingly, the Tanzanian government pulled out of the Open Government Partnership in 
June 2017. 
 
I4ID’s 2018 Annual Report captured the extent of the sea change in Tanzanian politics: 
‘Tanzania in early 2015 was a dominant party settlement with a weak, corruption-prone bureaucracy, 
facing significant internal factional competition and opposition party challenge. An increasingly vocal 
and critical set of institutions across Parliament, civil society, the private sector, and the media 
demonstrated an increasing ability to comment, critique, and influence policy.  
In early 2018, roughly half way through the first term of the Government, the context has changed 
significantly, and several trends are apparent… Taken together, these trends suggest that the President 
seeks to propel Tanzania more in the direction of operating as a technocratic, developmental state. 
Although this project is far from being consolidated, it does invite us to rethink I4ID’s basic strategy.’ 
 
For I4ID, the timing could hardly have been worse. A fledgling project, with foreign experts in DFID 
and Palladium largely in the driving seat, was knocked sideways before it was even up and running. 
Initially, most informed commentators advised that the talk of change was not going to last and 
Tanzanian politics would soon return to business as usual. Even when it became clear that this was 
not the case, ‘Because [the change of rhetoric] was still conceptual and not practical, it was still hard 
to see how it would affect the programme. It took time to realise what was happening - only when we 
started to meet MPs and started to realise you couldn’t/wouldn’t go beyond certain parameters.’ 
[Julie Adkins and Japhet Makongo, I4ID] 
 
As an adaptive programme, the programme had license to experiment and test different approaches 
for building institutional capabilities for programmatic politics (which many considered ambitious in 
Tanzania, in any context). Early efforts to work directly with MPs and elected representatives were 
proving disappointing. Development partners advised against trying to work directly with election 
institutions. Hence, the programme decided to experiment with working on the ‘demand side’ of 
elections – to test models for how media channels might encourage more issue-based programmatic 
discussion through their election campaign coverage, with a focus on by-elections taking place in early 
2018.   
 
The aim was to test whether candidates, through their representatives, could be influenced by citizens 
to shift their campaign modality away from personality politics to a more policy based, issues-oriented 
campaign. The event was initially judged a great success by I4ID, with participation of both a wide 
range of citizens’ groups and 12 political parties, resulting in considerable media coverage. However, 
                                                             
8 The shooting of opposition MP Tundu Lissu is still without successful investigation or explanation. 
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in the aftermath, local sensitivities aroused by the media coverage demonstrated to the project that 
elections, already a hotly contested and sensitive political process in Tanzania, were probably going 
to be an inappropriate entry-point for experiments in this kind of adaptive programme. 
 
 That experience, and an unsuccessful attempt to build the capacity of a cross party selection of MPs, 
triggered a major strategic rethink at I4ID’s January 2018 ‘Quarterly Strategic Review’. Direct work on 
Democratic Governance was scaled back in favour of a core focus on development issue-based 
programmes. ‘Democratic governance’ became a shadow of the original prominent intention, to date 
consisting mainly of engaging different institutions in forming change coalitions around less 
contentious development topics such as solid waste, menstrual health and disability education.  
The rethink went further than that. The 2018 Annual Report concluded that ‘The energy provided by 
the current administration’s reformist zeal has created entry points for I4ID, but also pressure to 
demonstrate strong alignment with the government’s agenda.’ I4ID’s response to both closing space 
and a more dominant and reformist government was recognising the need to align more closely with 
the government’s agenda, while maintaining their approach to scouting for and responding rapidly to 
‘points of entry’ for progressive change. 
 
Since March 2018, I4ID has increased the proportion its portfolio devoted to service delivery reforms 
with explicit support from state institutions (going with the grain), and inclusive growth opportunities 
with markets and private sector actors –– politically safer areas of operation given the state crackdown 
on political and civic institutions, and in line with the market systems9 background of I4ID’s new team 
leader, Sachin Gupta, who took over in September 2017. This multi-stakeholder approach seeks to 
identify the bottlenecks and coordination failures that hold back market, policy and service 
development, and that can be eased by convening/brokering and/or judicious offers of technical 
assistance and research. In some of its workstreams, I4ID’s approach now resembles a lean/agile 
development model, as in this figure taken from a January 2018 introduction to the programme. In 
practice, an important ‘selection’ step sits between steps 2 and 3, to which we return in our discussion.  
 
Figure 6: I4ID’s approach to adaptive programming 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 For more on market systems approaches, see https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-do-we-encourage-innovation-in-
markets-what-systems-thinking-can-add/ 
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I4ID team leader Sachin Gupta argues that the project has evolved from a simpler multi-stakeholder 
approach to a more nuanced systems approach: 
 
‘We consciously adapted this to take a ‘systems approach’, as a distinct pivot away from the simpler 
multi-stakeholder approach originally conceived. This was partly in response to donor pressure to look 
beyond “policy reform” toward “policy implementation”, and hence a conception that what really 
makes a difference to development impact is the complex interplay of policy, formal and informal 
norms, central actors, supporting services, enabling environment... i.e. a complex system. A systems 
approach appreciates that existing forms and functions have arisen through complex, intersecting 
processes – rather than just different stakeholders set against each other. Hence our approach is 
based on multiple interventions, tackling multiple problems around the system, trying to find 
innovations that can solve for the multiple failures and dysfunctions that characterise a complex 
system challenge.’10   
 
It is worth considering whether/how this differs from other approaches to Adaptive Management. Our 
impression during an admittedly brief visit to Dar es Salaam is that in its current early phase, I4ID is 
betting on initially adding value by tackling coordination failures and knowledge gaps, has a cautious 
approach to politics and power, and does not focus much (yet) on citizen engagement. We will return 
to this question later in the paper. 
 
How well I4ID navigates future shocks and stresses will depend in large part on the evolving interaction 
between donors, contractors and Tanzanian staff. It is to these mechanisms – the nuts and bolts of 
Adaptive Management, that we now turn. 
  
                                                             
10 Sachin Gupta, pers. Comm. October 2018 
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3 Mechanisms of Adaptive Management 
Adaptive Management involves a dynamic interaction between 3 elements: delivery, programming 
and governance. 
 
Adaptive Delivery (AD) is a way of doing development differently in the day-to-day. Instead of 
Implementing the Plan, frontline staff think on their feet, continuously navigating through a fog of 
ever-changing conditions, many moving parts and players, ambiguity and uncertainty. They do this 
using networks, curiosity, evidence, emotional intelligence and instinct (noticing the frown on the face 
of the minister and changing tack in mid conversation) in a powerful blend of on-the-spot learning, 
thinking and decision-making. In this way, frontline workers come up with best guesses on what to do 
next, then test and correct in a continuous engagement and learning process. Adaptive delivery is 
often highly collegial: checking with others, mentoring, making sure they’re not off piste or getting it 
totally wrong. It happens in weekly meetings, in chats with colleagues, sharing insights, advice, media 
summaries and other intel. 
 
Adaptive Programming (AP) is a more conscious and deliberate process, usually in the hands of the 
senior management within the programme office and informed by frontline staff and the patterns 
that they are spotting/emerging from AD. In terms of adaptation, it involves less frequent cycles of 
reflection on in-situ strategy: how the broader programme is doing, and the context is evolving. 
Adaptive programming is often informed by commissioning expert analysis and bringing in critical 
friends to help question and challenge, in order to identify new directions and opportunities. Adaptive 
programming is sometimes needed to counter the inertia that can build up in adaptive delivery 
processes – the result of staff making extensive investments in building knowledge and networks that 
can easily create a desire to ‘stay in the game’, even if the context has moved on - a temptation that 
can only be overcome if strong adaptive programming shapes the nature of adaptive delivery. 
 
Adaptive Governance (AG) normally resides with the donor, in particular the officer(s) in the donor 
agency responsible for funding the programme, following its progress. To support performance, they 
must manage upwards, coping with the inevitable pressures for results, reporting and shifting 
priorities that swirl around any donor agency (nationally and in HQ), and manage downwards, 
ensuring that the programme accounts for how it is spending donor money, but also retains the 
freedom of manoeuvre that lies at the heart of AM approaches. This includes putting in place 
conditions that create space for flexibility and adaptation (see below under MEL).  
Figure 7:  The relationship between Adaptive Delivery, Adaptive Programming & Adaptive Governance 
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Figure 6 captures the relationships between AD, AP and AG when things are going well in international 
aid projects. In practice, they are constantly evolving, and can often be fraught. The basic currency of 
adaptive management is trust between the various players and tiers evolved. Players in all three roles 
are under pressure and face in two directions at once: Delivery means both being accountable and 
sensitive to partners and communities on the ground, and responsive to programming bosses in the 
office; Programming means working with donor expectations, systems and needs while shielding staff 
so they can do the work without excessive oversight or interference from the top; Governance 
requires keeping the various tiers of the donor agency hierarchy onside, while also doing some 
shielding – of the programme from the exigencies of donor processes. Managing these competing 
needs is seldom easy or comfortable. It must evolve as the work and relationships gather momentum. 
 
In its first two years, I4ID has seen an evolving dance between these three elements, captured in the 
graphic below, working through some of these challenges along the way. In its initial phase, before 
many Tanzanian staff were brought on board, the main dynamic was between governance and 
programming, prior to front-line staff being hired and active. The 9-month inception phase up to 
March 2017 entailed analysis, reflection and design and some limited activity. The original ToRs 
required that the project had begun piloting at least two initiatives before the end of the inception 
period. This was one of the main reasons the project scored its B. The lengthy design focus was 
experienced by some of the team members as problematic (see ‘Timing’ discussion, below). 
 
As the programme took root, national staff were brought in and two circles became three, as Adaptive 
Delivery became possible and started to pick up speed.  Nevertheless, the project scored a ‘B’ in its 
first report for not making enough headway (had not initiated pilots, had not established a convincing 
Theory of Change etc). Projects that score two Bs in a row are under enormous pressure to shut down, 
so Palladium and I4ID felt under pressure to pick up the pace of delivery. While this score was about 
project performance, of which contractor performance is only one part, it did lead to more scrutiny 
by DFID of the evidence that the contractor (Palladium) was doing what it could to turn it around. Poor 
performance and the B score eroded trust between donors and the programme and led to a situation 
in which the donors took a more hands-on role. Hence, the second phase looks like the second Venn 
diagram, with donors interacting directly with staff, as well as with management. In the words of 
DFID’s Helen Barnes: ‘we started meeting the project team on a weekly basis, because nothing was 
moving. Palladium HQ was also getting more involved.’ 
Figure 8:  
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A new team leader, a concerted effort to establish new ways of working that fitted the changing 
context, ‘taking the plunge’ by getting stuck into activities, and the first signs of results on the ground, 
all helped rebuild trust and move the programme increasingly towards the third diagram. Currently, 
programme leadership is increasingly clear about how to engage with donors in ways that do not 
undermine constructive dynamics, and which conversations can best happen at which levels. This 
allows frontline staff to develop their work with fewer direct pressures from DFID. New rules of 
engagement are being negotiated as results are starting to show. According to Helen Barnes, this is 
still work in progress: ‘now we get more of a sense of what is happening and have been able to shift 
to monthly meetings. Next we are trying to work out how to come out of involvement in the detail.’ 
There is a dilemma here for the team leader and SRO – putting frontline staff into discussions with 
donors gives the granularity of experience and can help build relationships and trust. However, when 
this has been attempted, some donor staff have shown impatience, asking for rapid summaries rather 
than in-depth discussions. How can the delivery process best interact with the governance process – 
and should it? 
 
Our interviews and discussions shed further light into the dynamics of these three interacting 
elements. 
 
Adaptive Governance: Large bilateral donors are not monoliths but are themselves complex systems 
full of internal alliances and pressures. The key figure in the Adaptive Management chain is the person 
responsible for the programme, known in DFID as SROs (Senior Responsible Owners). Here is DFID 
SRO Helen Barnes on some of the pressures she faces: ‘DFID internal systems mean that I have to be 
able to answer at any point of any day what my project is doing. Otherwise, people think I’m not doing 
my job.’.  Her investment in DfID Tanzania colleagues is to foster understanding of and interaction 
with the project and is more salient than dealing with requests from HQ in the UK Hence the 
importance of knowledge about what is happening and trust that good stuff is happening. If the SRO 
trusts that the programme is on track and working well – and can tell a good story about it, she can 
work at arm’s length and rely on the I4ID senior management to keep her up to date. As soon as that 
trust is dented, she will feel the need to be better informed which means spending more time with 
senior leadership and frontline staff, both to get the programme back on track, and to know in detail 
what is/isn’t happening, so she can be accountable within DFID. Helen Barnes is keenly aware of the 
potential contradictions this creates for adaptive management: how to distinguish between purposive 
and effective experimentation, and ineffectiveness and lethargy.  
 
Endemic high staff turnover in donors exacerbates the sense of volatility and uncertainty of risky, 
novelty programmes such as I4ID. A recent change in the rules by the new DfID Country Director 
means that since early 2018, DFID’s senior Leadership Team in Tanzania now must approve any new 
I4ID workstream, in part based on whether it is aligned with DFID’s programme priorities in the 
country. The time-consuming transition towards theme-constrained new requirements has not 
hampered I4ID in terms of approval: all proposed workstreams are going forward. While there are 
significant challenges to alignment, some potential advantages can include additional technical and 
other resources, potential for sustainability and scale-up, heightened awareness and interest across 
the office. So far, I4ID retains considerable space for its work.  
 
The newly tightened focus on alignment of issue priorities with DFID’s country strategy has added to 
the work burden and tensions for the SRO. This poses problems for I4ID in terms of their freedom to 
be agile when selecting palatable, emerging issues. Rather than only knowing about ‘governance’ 
under which I4ID technically falls, each new area of issue-based work brings with it new colleagues 
that the SRO must keep informed and convinced, and an ever-expanding portfolio of priorities to stay 
on top of. For example, with disability education emerging as an area for engagement, the SRO needs 
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to keep more people informed and must insulate I4ID from them, exacerbating the pressure on I4ID 
to provide detailed information on each step of each new issue.  
 
The point here is that keeping donors on board is essential – they hold open the space for working 
adaptively. This requires updating them enough on progress towards relevant results to maintain trust 
and confidence. Doing this has meant negotiating a level of engagement and documentation that is 
not too excessive. The current compromise includes: an issues dashboard and a more concise 
approach to the bi-annual report. 
 
Adaptive Governance – Adaptive Programming: The interaction between the SRO and the I4ID team 
leader and senior management is central. Helen Barnes again: ‘Sachin and I are building a double 
buffer. We need each other and fight each other all the time – the relationship is crucial. I say, ‘I need 
this’ and he says ’I can’t give you that, but how about this?’ He needs to understand my situation. He 
protects staff from me, but also helps me manage upwards.’ This kind of effective working relationship 
creates the space for adaptive work – working together to resolve internal challenges in practical ways 
that meet everyone’s needs, while challenging each other.   
 
The interaction is partly driven by the different interests in the AM ‘supply chain’. According to DFID’s 
Nick Leader: ‘We’re constantly pushing Palladium back up the outcome chain. We push them towards 
outcomes – if you do your job right, you can achieve these things. It has to be more than just ‘we are 
doing XYZ’ [outputs, rather than outcomes].’ 
 
I4ID’s team leader, Sachin Gupta, accepts the need to ‘feed the beast’ – keeping DfID well-informed, 
fulfilling its (changing) protocols, and above all showing progress towards results as soon as possible. 
There is an ongoing challenge in knowing who needs what information and how to document 
efficiently and appropriately. He worried about the opportunity costs and expressed frustration about 
early phase contradictions between what DFID demands and then uses: ‘The culture of DfID with 
reviewing documents is to respond with a lengthy stream of consciousness from multiple members of 
staff providing comments, for example around the draft inception report, with endless questions of 
varying significance that tie up staff time and stop them developing the programme. … they demand 
more and more details and when you share those details, they say, ‘please summarize it, I only have 
20 minutes for the meeting.’  This is a considerable burden for the team leader, multiple updates with 
multiple DfID people, a pattern DfID and I4ID are actively working on reducing.  
 
Adaptive Governance-Adaptive Delivery: Because of poor performance in the first 12 months of I4ID, 
the adaptive governance and delivery functions have been interacting more directly than would ideally 
be the case. Governance staff from the donors have been attending I4ID’s two day ‘Quarterly Strategic 
Reflections’ in order both to get a clearer picture of what is happening and support the development 
of the programme. Unfortunately, Tanzanian staff experience the questioning from donors in these 
meetings as something akin to interrogation and disapproval, and see the QSRs as a trial, rather than 
an opportunity. In response, staff have even set up a parallel set of meetings, known as PRRPs 
(Participation Review, Reflection and Planning) where they can have the kind of open discussion that 
they do not feel is possible at the QSRs. From the point of view of adaptive delivery, the lack of safe 
space to share the ups and downs of work in progress – and brainstorm about new opportunities no 
matter how unusual - risks replacing staff’s need to read and respond to the ‘frown on the face of the 
minister’, with the less productive need to read ‘the frown on the face of the DFID official.’  
 
The relationship between Governance and Delivery prompted divergent views. Put crudely: is the job 
of the donor in an AM programme to get the right organizations in place and ensure that governance, 
reporting etc are sufficiently robust to keep the money flowing, but otherwise to stay out of the way 
of frontline staff, because they do not know the context as well and are simply too powerful (as 
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sources of jobs and budgets) to be mere participants? Or can donor staff contribute beyond funding, 
for example by giving direct recognition to the work of local staff, spreading positive messages through 
their networks, including national governments, or bringing in their knowledge of similar 
programming in other contexts, or their judgement and networks as development professionals? If 
frontline delivery staff are failing to perform, should donors be involved in resolving the problem, or 
should that be left to the contractor? We heard both sides of the argument and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a more positive take from DFID staff than from frontline workers. 
 
Adaptive Programming-Adaptive Delivery: The internal ‘dance’ between more strategic 
programming and more day-to-day delivery is an essential aspect of adaptive management. In the 
early months of I4ID, delivery came a distant third to the interaction of governance and programming. 
Now, however, as workstreams are being developed, and staff are brought on board, delivery of 
activities is starting to pick up speed.  
A good example of what the early days of success can look like comes from some recent work on 
Menstrual Management with the win on removing VAT on menstrual products, translating into an 
18% price reduction on some products, for example. Other substantive results include: (1) Increased 
protection and support for the domestic sunflower sector through import tariffs; (2) Tanzania Food 
and Drugs Authority (TFDA) approval for retail distribution of re-usable menstrual cups (Oct 2018) and 
(3) The Ministry of Education’s formal adoption of Tanzania Sign Language as the sole language of 
instruction (Oct 2018). 
Box 3: Adaptive Management meets Menstrual Products 
Only a small fraction of Tanzanian women uses improved menstrual products like sanitary pads. The 
remaining 80% are reported to be using a variety of materials from cloth rags, ugali, soil, cow dung, to 
corn cobs. Reusable cloth rags are mostly used, but due to cultural sensitivities, poor management of 
them has been linked to increased cases of discomfort, fungus, UTIs, and other related diseases. 
The key figure for I4ID is Mwanahamisi Singano (universally known as Mishy). Before joining I4ID, she’d 
been active in the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP – Tanzania’s largest 
women’s/feminist movement). On International Women’s Day this year, Mishy was facilitating a TGNP 
event, after which they got into a conversation about MHM. 
TGNP wanted to lobby for free sanitary pads in schools (girls miss classes because of the lack of 
facilities). The trouble was that the politics were all wrong - an opposition MP had already proposed 
the idea and been rejected. Mishy and TGNP had allies in government (feminists, old school friends 
etc) who wanted to move forward, but needed a different angle to distinguish their demands from 
those of the opposition. 
They needed a quick win to gain some momentum and profile and found it in VAT – Tanzania’s 
equivalent of the tampon tax. Exemption would reduce the wholesale price by 18% at a stroke, paving 
the way for increased demand. Mishy worked with TGNP to coordinate the lobbying – they got the 
support of women MPs and the Ministries of Health and Education, who agreed to take it to the real 
decision maker – the Ministry of Finance. The MoF checked how much it would cost, found it to be 
fairly small (due to the low levels of demand) and signed off. Voila – quick win! 
They had some momentum, what next? I4ID was looking for a niche – something not already being 
done by other actors working on the infrastructure and educational aspects of menstrual health. I4ID 
reckoned the big gap was sorting out the market. Could they pull together the various manufacturers 
and distributors to work together to boost access and lobby for policy change? 
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Which is how we ended up sitting in on a meeting of 8 manufacturers at the I4ID office. ‘Human 
Cherish’, ‘Relief Pad’, ‘Glory Pads’, ‘Elea Pads’ and ‘Lunette Menstrual Cups’, among others, were more 
accustomed to being in competition with each other, but Mishy had brought them together essentially 
to try and persuade them to set up a business association.  
Mishy winds up the meeting, and in the last 15 minutes goes around the table, getting the companies 
to sign up to a join marketing effort. She says I4ID could find and pay a consultant to design a joint 
marketing plan, and the reps jump at the idea – research and technical assistance are I4ID’s second 
main tool, along with convening/brokering. 
Summarizing a combination of key features involved in the adaptive delivery side of AM: 
 Well-networked local activists and ‘development entrepreneurs’, with good facilitation skills 
 Agile money that can stump up small amounts quickly for a meeting hall on International 
Women’s Day, or a quick bit of market research 
 Quick wins to get momentum publicly and with key stakeholders 
 A systems approach to spotting drivers and blockers of change 
It may be easier to do this kind of work on ‘new’ issues – menstruation is hardly new, but it has 
previously been a taboo in public policy. That means that positions are not entrenched, and 
institutions and opinions are more malleable and (dare I say it?) amenable to evidence. 
Taken from a post on the From Poverty to Power blog, 15th August 2018 
 
Delivery has been affected from many directions, of which two emerged as key: the decision to drop 
local coordinators and the Magufuli shock. The initial proposal anticipated employing many local 
coordinators – arguably the real frontline staff – outside the capital. However, this plan was dropped. 
Sachin Gupta feels the original proposal was unrealistic and reflected an important trade-off: hiring 
local coordinators as staff, embedded in-situ, but isolated from strategy development in the central 
office versus working with locally situated partner organisations through a smaller centralised team 
in Dar es Salaam. He chose the latter. 
 
Operating constraints existed pre-Magufuli of course, but since his election there has been increased 
centralization of decision making in government, and greater difficulty in getting permits/approvals to 
conduct and disseminate research. This has slowed down the project’s ability to move quickly and 
widely. Furthermore, the level of fear both within government and civil society means that the 
appetite for taking risks and ruffling feathers is significantly lower.  As with other AM programmes, 
recruiting the right kind of staff – development entrepreneurs – is also proving a challenge: aid-
oriented workers accustomed to the ‘first orthodoxy’ of linear logframes and target-driven project 
implementation are poorly suited to AM approaches. I4ID is increasingly looking outside the aid sector 
to bring in the requisite competencies. This suggests that adaptive programmes need to think 
realistically about how to be nimble and agile, given both operating constraints (see above) and 
regulatory constraints. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 summarise the dynamics between the three domains of AM –what happens when AM 
works well, and what happens when tensions and problems arise.  
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Figure 9:  When adaptive management works well 
 
Figure 10:  When adaptive management does not work well 
 
Other Mechanisms 
National v International Identity and AM Potential 
‘At some point, we have to move beyond white people coming and telling us how to do things we’ve 
been doing for 15 years.’ (Tanzanian MP, reported comment) 
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How Tanzanian is I4ID? Even if it was originally forged in the back offices of DFID and Palladium, could 
it then acquire Tanzanian-ness over time? How essential is this to achieving its goals through AM? 
These topics were one of the dominant themes in discussions with staff and others during our brief 
visit. Initially, the project was designed around the inclusion of numerous foreign ‘experts’ in the 
winning bid. One of DfID’s points of feedback on the bid was insufficient Tanzanian staff. Over time, 
there has been a shift in staffing from foreign-dominated to largely Tanzanian staff. The balance of 
consultants has been much stickier, and still has a preponderance of non-Tanzanians. Whether this is 
down to bias or skills shortages or competency gaps in Tanzania is an open question, depending on 
who you ask. Within the team, Tanzanian staff were less convinced about the default to ‘foreign 
expert’, while foreign staff saw no other option in most cases.  
 
Whatever the explanation, we came away concerned. Ongoing reliance on non-Tanzanian expertise 
without a clear and speedy transition strategy has several disadvantages that affect adaptive 
programming and delivery:  
 
 foreigners are unlikely to have the granular understanding (the ‘antennae’) that becomes 
increasingly necessary as the programme deepens its engagement, affecting not only what is 
strategically selected and when (programming) but also how the dance of change evolves day-
to-day (delivery). For example, foreigners are more likely to make small but critical blunders 
because of their lack of sufficient ‘antennae’, e.g. knowing when to (or not to) interrupt a 
regional commissioner’s half hour introductory speech; how dress code sends a message on 
how important the meetings and therefore relationship is; which political actor can engage in 
humorous banter and which one should be cajoled with religious phrases. 
 whether it proves able to recognize, support and build the skills of local staff may well decide 
whether I4ID leaves a legacy, after the project ends in 2021 – and legacy is critical if the long-
term evolutionary nature of AM is to deliver the scale/nature of potential impacts that its 
proponents claim are possible. Will five years be enough, or will further phases be needed to 
have a sustained impact (as has been the case for the other comparable DFID-funded AM 
projects in Myanmar and Nigeria studied in this research project)?  
 foreigners are increasingly constrained in Tanzania’s closing political space (see below) 
possibly affecting the legitimacy of I4ID and its ability to have impact at scale.  
 foreigners are relatively expensive, chewing up resources that could be committed to scaling 
up in-country work to enable AM (more experiments, larger scope, more issues, strengthening 
capacity).  
 
But international consultants clearly offer some potential advantages too, from which I4ID has 
benefited: 
 They may have technical or area specific expertise that is not available in country (e.g. on solid 
waste management). 
 They can bring in cross country experiences, networks and insights (e.g. on menstrual product 
marketing). 
 They can provide capacity building and mentoring by working with local consultants and team 
members (e.g. around gender equity and social inclusion, GESI). 
Reality is a good deal more complex than a simple ‘Tanzanian v foreigner’ binary. Returning Diaspora, 
‘localized’ foreign-born staff with decades in the country, foreigners who may be based outside 
Tanzania, but have deep roots in and knowledge of the country context through past research – all 
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have different strengths and weaknesses in what they have to offer adaptive management 
approaches. 
 
Moreover, even if the kind of expertise you are looking for is held by a handful of people in country, 
they are often in very senior and responsible jobs, for whom short term work has little appeal. For 
example, the German aid agency GIZ have been working in the water sector in Tanzania for 20 years 
and is able to hire very senior Tanzanians on long term contracts. They are unlikely to be willing to 
swap such jobs for an adaptive programme trying small bets. 
 
This debate also raises important questions over what counts as ‘expertise’. The political antennae to 
spot a new opportunity and ‘dance with the system’ are skills often not recognized as ‘expertise’, 
which instead is accorded to more technical skills. That means that local staff with political smarts are 
not seen as ‘experts’, which then allows the argument to continue that international technical 
consultants are ‘experts’, whereas local staff/partners are there to have their capacity strengthened 
by those experts. AM requires both kinds of expertise, and it is difficult to see an argument for why 
one should have more status than the other. While leadership takes pride in equally weighting and 
valuing both foreign and local counterparts, the I4ID national staff we spoke with do not feel their 
expertise is on an equal footing with that of foreign expertise.  
 
Putting AM into practice requires combining finer grained and rapidly evolving analysis and long-term 
commitment and national legitimacy with the ability to deploy issue-specific specialists quickly and on 
an experimental basis. The lack of a Tanzanian organization in the I4ID consortium may well have 
inhibited its ability to respond quickly and adeptly to the Magufuli shock. Instead, I4ID has built a large 
and flexible pool of Tanzanian consultants. Although this could in theory produce a greater degree of 
flexibility than employing a fixed group of Tanzanians in the programme, whether that is true in 
practice depends on the level of influence and respect enjoyed by the consultants within the wider 
programme. The risk is that, as is the case for most of aid, consultants often lack clout in decision-
making relative to permanent staff. 
 
A final issue that has been thrown into sharper relief by the Magufuli shock is legitimacy. All foreign 
aid programmes wrestle with this, but none more so than governance programmes seeking to 
strengthen the policies and institutions of the host country to become more inclusive and accountable. 
What ensures such work isn’t (wrongfully) construed as undue foreign interference? Any influencing 
programme dependent on foreign funds and expertise, like I4ID, is particularly vulnerable to such 
accusations, which in a time of closing political space, can become a source of acute vulnerability. I4ID 
has responded by flying under the radar for longer and focusing on less-politicised issues (see ‘The 
Elusive USP’ below).  
 
So, what drives this foreign-expert dominated model? In part the contractor model.  
The Contractor Model 
The emerging implementation model of AM in DFID is for relatively large (£10-£100m) programmes 
to be run in-country by private management contractors, such as Palladium, based in OECD countries.  
 
This has strengths and weaknesses in terms of AM. On the plus side, contractors can build up a body 
of AM expertise, and achieve cross-learning between countries. They find it easier to be agile, for 
example in replacing under-performing personnel, compared to more bureaucratic, process-heavy 
organizations such as governments or INGOs. They spot problems early on in terms of management 
and donor relations, and can deal with them swiftly, for example by bringing in new leadership when 
programmes go off track. They understand how donors work, and what donors need to see in order 
to build the all-important trust relationships that underpin AM.  
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Contracts are used when a service is needed: donors seek a ‘service provider’, develops a client 
relationship with them, and the provider delivers a specified service. Funding of (I)NGOs is different – 
or should be. It is linked to their mandate, as much as to what they can deliver.  
 
On the negative side, they have shallow roots (if any) in country, which, when combined with the 
recruiting tendency discussed above, can mean they lack the political antennae that are such a vital 
part of Adaptive Management, or a commitment to grow those national roots beyond the lifetime of 
the project.  
 
This is not to say that local organizations are automatically more adaptive, skilled, legitimate or 
politically palatable. CSOs and others steeped in the bureaucratic traditions of the logframe and the 
‘roll out’ of pre-agreed plans are unlikely to be any more agile (and may be even less so).  
Partnership 
What impact do Adaptive Management approaches have on the ability of aid implementers to build 
strong partnerships with local organizations? Our discussions in Tanzania suggest it can be a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, AM approaches allow I4ID to be responsive to the shifts in local 
context and the emerging needs of local organizations for small grants, technical assistance etc. On 
the other hand, if the restlessness inherent in AM leads to a ‘chop and change’ approach between the 
programme and local partners, then it can be experienced as a lack of commitment by them, which 
can undermine trust. At the very least, it is important that Adaptively Managed programmes explain 
their decisions, and preferably include local partners in making them. 
According to Sachin Gupta: ‘Because we are being adaptive, we have struggled to make long term 
‘friendships’ with local organisations – even when we have had the opportunity to do so after the bid 
had been won – but rather our penchant for chopping and changing and adapting has made local 
organisations wary of us… We still haven’t found a way to make adaptive approaches work for local 
organisations, and are now working much harder (e.g. dropping small grants to help small 
organisations, being more flexible with our funding, investing more coordination support) . . . but that 
is something we should be honest about and say we didn’t do well so far – mainly because we are 
trying to be so adaptive.’11 
The Elusive USP 
‘You’re trying to describe a llama to someone who has never seen one.’ Julie Adkins, I4ID 
 
Tanzania already has a lot of aid, and a lot of aid donors, so what is special about I4ID’s adaptive 
management approach – does this constitute its ‘unique selling point’?  
 
Firstly, who is doing the buying of what I4ID has to offer - an AM approach to inclusive development? 
The USP in the eyes of donors is likely to be different from that in the eyes of Tanzanian government, 
or Tanzanian civil society organisations. The USP for donors is perhaps the simplest – an experiment 
in a popular new way of doing governance programming, with some of its most experienced 
practitioners (Palladium) and best-known intellectual heavyweights (ODI) in the consortium. However, 
the llama problem still besets governance staff in donors trying to convince their non-governance 
peers, managers and political masters.  
 
The USP among Tanzanian institutions is more elusive, and is shaped both by the sector in question 
and the shifting political context: 
 
                                                             
11 Sachin Gupta, pers comm 
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Agile money: I4ID is a source of small, quick money in a sector where big, slow money is the norm. 
This enables I4ID to respond quickly to new opportunities and build relationships with potential 
partners. But there are risks attached: Tanzania has a long history of aid dependence, with a ‘carpe 
per diem’ culture of sitting fees. The money is very small so far, disproportionate to the issues and 
expectations of results. Sachin Gupta is keen to downplay the agile money option, to avoid I4ID 
becoming seen as a ‘cash cow’ at the expense of a nimbler role as facilitator. Managing expectations 
so that it is seen as, at best, a ‘cash chicken’, is important. Staff appear to have varying understandings 
of the cash chicken potential, referring regularly in conversations to the ‘cash off the table’ principle 
being a real obstacle to their efforts to generate local interest in I4ID’s work.  
 
Convening and brokering: AM programmes like I4ID often seek to convene/broker new coalitions, e.g. 
of private sector actors that lack the resources or vision to do it themselves, or on new issues where 
interest groups with fixed positions have yet to emerge. This relies on understanding the range and 
incentives of the universe of stakeholders on any given issue, and on their willingness to allow I4ID to 
bring them together. So far, this willingness seems stronger in the private sector (e.g. work on solid 
waste management or menstrual products - see boxes) than with state actors. Convening in the state 
sector has been further undermined by the Magufuli shock, which has led to further questioning of 
the legitimacy of foreign aid actors wishing to influence state policies and practices, increased risk 
aversion within government, and decreased appetite for innovation. Moreover, the government’s 
crackdown on sources of opposition has reduced the number of potential Tanzanian partners, who 
may also be more reluctant to be ‘convened and brokered’ by initiatives like I4ID, for fear of being 
branded as the tools of foreigners. 
Box 4: Can Adaptive Management help clear Tanzania’s rubbish mountains? 
Waste collectors in Tanzania’s capital, Dar Es Salaam. must plough their way through a mound of 
bureaucratic and practical obstacles. The government provides waste collectors with little subsidy or 
help with fee collection. Many residents fail to pay refuse collection charges because their service has 
got so bad, and the only legal dumpsite is dangerous and out of control, a long way from the city. 
The resulting accumulation of rubbish and illegal dumping sites is not only ugly and smelly, but 
dangerous: Soil and water contamination affects public health and marine life, while the build-up of 
rubbish in waterways contributes to devastating and deadly flooding every year. 
How can a relatively small AM programme like I4ID make a dent on Dar’s rubbish mountain? 
To find out, we visited three venues that gave us a sense of the range of Dar’s Solid Waste 
Management (SWM) challenges and how AM approaches can help resolve them. First, we meet 
GreenWaste Pro, a modern company collecting rubbish in some of the richer parts of Dar – their 450 
employees serve an estimated one million people. 
The system, where residents can pay, works by companies winning a licence to manage a whole Ward, 
to collect fees set by government (50p per family per month), collect their garbage, and keep the 
streets clean. 
The main barrier to Greenwaste’s expansion is non-payment, so they’re trying some tech innovation. 
Next week, they are attaching small plaques with RFID chips to the front doors of some of their 
customers, so they can monitor their payments. The politically smart bit was getting the municipal 
government to agree to having its logo on them – that means residents won’t touch them. In 
exchange, the government is hoping the data from the chips can help it with tax collection, among 
other things. 
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I4ID’s contribution is paying for the 5,000 RFID tags for an initial pilot (the company has its own bright 
young techie who developed the idea – no need for tech help there), brokering a relationship with 
University of Dar es Salaam Data Lab who helped with the open source mapping tool and an army of 
students to go door to door installing the tags and gathering information, and a plan to broker 
conversations with other waste companies to advocate for much needed reforms. 
Then it’s off to a giant dusty packing shed, where Allen Kimambo, a classically hyperactive and driven 
entrepreneur, has set up Zaidi, a company that recycles cardboard. Now he wants to move into ‘white 
paper’ as well. Here I4ID is paying for the initial wage bill and some technical support – Allen is loudly 
appreciative of the technical advice he’s had from a recycler-cum-consultant, who I4ID is hiring to 
advise both Zaidi and Greenwaste. 
Less than five per cent of the city’s wards are served by formally regulated companies, mainly in the 
richer and commercial parts of Dar.   
SWM in Dar’s poorer quarters is left to each neighbourhood to manage, where leaders at the lowest 
tier of government, the mtaa, are responsible for finding a fix. Some leaders take it seriously and can 
source decent service providers, although rubbish collectors often struggle to provide a good service 
and still break even, while others do deals with their cronies, allowing them to collect some fees while 
leaving waste uncollected or dumping it in fields and rivers. 
Our final visit is to the ‘Cashpoint’ company in a poor area of Dar called Manzese. The ‘office’ is actually 
Jenny and Kyalo Mbatha’s front room, one of ten households in a busy compound with lines of 
washing drying over stagnant, evil-looking puddles. 
Back in 2008, Jenny decided to give up the kiosk and go into the waste management business, but 
found hardly anyone paid their monthly fees. Since then it has been an endless struggle to collect 
enough fees to make the collection viable, complicated by the additional obligation to keep the ward 
clean – so you can’t punish non-fee-payers’ by leaving their rubbish on the street. 
Jenny’s fame has spread, and she now has contracts for 5 mtaas – about 3000 people. I4ID is 
supporting her to expand by experimenting with an approach she piloted in her first mtaa – 
embedding the service charge in a Pay As You Go pre-paid bright green rubbish bag. In the past, 
Cashpoint has managed to change the culture of payment and get fee payment rates up to 70% in 6 
months, then stop using the green bags (they’re expensive) and get people to keep paying. 
What’s interesting is that Jenny and Kyalo have already thought of and/or tried every idea we come 
up with for improving fee collection (and we have at least 2 PhDs in the room). Collective peer 
pressure, a la microfinance; punish defaulters with delayed collection; a premium service for good 
payers; name and shame. 
Which really got us thinking about I4ID’s ‘USP’ – unique selling point. Just for comparison, the much 
larger World Bank concluded a few years ago that the institutional breakdowns behind Dar’s rubbish 
mountain were just too complex and messy for them to get anywhere. Can an adaptive management 
approach designed precisely to navigate such messiness do any better? 
Too early to say. I4ID’s current offer seems to be a combination of technical assistance/research, 
convening and brokering conversations between players who don’t normally meet, and small pots of 
quick money to try things out, unblock processes and build relationships.  
Taken from a post on the From Poverty to Power blog, 16th August 2018 
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Technical Assistance: I4ID is able rapidly to identify and hire experts to provide evidence and guidance 
on a range of issues. This has enabled it to forge good partnerships with organizations like the 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), which acts as a kind of parastatal thinktank for the 
Tanzanian government. Experience from other closed political spaces such as Vietnam suggests that 
such thinktanks act as a vital and trusted path for feeding evidence and ideas into policy-making 
processes. 
 
Unlocking Market Potential: In practice, a combination of the reaction to the Magufuli shock and the 
closing down of spaces for influencing the state, the pressure for quick results, and the personal 
experience of the new Team Leader seems for now to have pushed I4ID towards a politically-informed 
market systems approach that focuses on essential services (water, education, solid waste 
management, menstrual health), in which it uses a combination of agile funding, technical assistance 
and convening and brokering to address coordination and other market failures, with the aim of 
generating greater economic dynamism. Sachin Gupta believes the political shock has led to an 
interesting and innovative response: ‘I see it as a systems approach – borrowed from market systems 
- but applied more widely to integrated state-community-market systems.’ 
 
Sachin Gupta sees this emerging focus as the best response to the shock: ‘has I4ID given up on 
governance too easily? My considered reaction is that I think our scale presumption is an important 
factor in this – the investment of almost £12m of taxpayer’s money demands an ambition for 
transformational scale impact – hence I do think it’s right that we look for silver bullets, rather than 
small isolated approaches (unless we see a good route to scale from those smaller grounded 
approaches). I don’t think we can do transformational governance work in the current context without 
risking getting locked up, passports confiscated, or risking our (and DFID’s) overall license to operate.’ 
 
Cautious branding. Being political in Tanzania means thinking carefully on whose radar I4ID should 
be. Our questions about Tanzanian identity and legacy led to discussions on why branding matters and 
for who. Team leadership is intentionally low key, preferring no high public profile and flying under 
the radar. In part this is due to the need to deflect attention from I4ID as a foreign aid project, in part 
because there is little to show so far. Now that issues are selected, initial activities started and low-
level results harvested, a more public profile can be created.  
 
The Adaptive Management Toolbox: I4ID’s repertoire of techniques includes funding research and 
technical assistance, convening and brokering across different networks, and hiring people with 
political antennae. If anything, the impact of closing civic and political space has made it tend towards 
the conservative in its choice of approaches. Yet there is a strong case that if space is shrinking, the 
range of tools should become broader and more experimental to compensate. This could include:  
Working with a wider range of stakeholders (e.g. religious leaders, or cultural figures) could resuscitate 
the benefits of broad alliances and multi-stakeholder approaches that have been limited by closing 
political space. 
 
Multiple parallel experiments and cross-learning: The focus on single option pilots makes learning 
slower and reduces potential innovation. Why not run multiple parallel experiments and rapidly select 
the most promising ones? Solid Waste Management is potentially such a process. Similarly, we have 
seen no sign of exchanges between Tanzanian staff and partners and people and organizations 
working on similar issues in other countries, whether in East Africa or beyond. That would seem to be 
a valuable alternative way of accessing ideas and knowledge, rather than relying purely on fly-in 
experts. 
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Positive Deviance: Positive Deviance seeks to identify, learn from and spread outliers that already 
occur in any given system. In this case, for example, particularly inclusive parts of local or national 
government or the private sector. AM is currently characterized by its problem focus – for example in 
the approach known as Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation, which spends considerable time drilling 
down into ‘the problem’ before moving on to devise and test possible solutions. Why not try SDIA - 
Success-Driven Iterative Adaptation? Many aid programmes, including I4ID, pursue a form of ad hoc 
positive deviance, in the sense that they look for promising initiatives or individuals and then back 
them. But proper PD is a more systematic approach, intentionally identifying positive outliers and 
trying to understand what determines their success, and how it can spread.12 
Closing Spaces, Inclusion and Working with the Grain 
The I4ID programme is drawn broadly, by AM standards, and the turbulence of its early years has 
challenged two terms in its name – institutions and inclusion. Clarity on both are essential for AM – 
institutions and inclusion shape both the theory of action and level of aspiration.  
 
What does I4ID understand as institutions? Although there are differences in the approaches adopted 
in I4ID’s different workstreams, overall, what we saw during our brief visit was the primacy of the 
state in I4ID’s mental – and operational – map, as the stakeholder to influence and also stay friends 
with. After that comes the private sector/markets and to a lesser extent, some interest in social norms 
and academia (seen as a particularly promising institution, given the President’s fondness for fellow 
academics). Closing political space has sharply reduced I4ID’s ability and appetite to work with political 
parties and activist CSOs, while others (e.g. religious leaders, unions, professional associations) appear 
to be entirely off I4ID’s radar.  
 
The few CSOs we talked to during our stay regard this as over-cautious – they think there is still space 
for a more pluralist approach, and that the current crackdown may be reversed. Discussions with the 
team did suggest an awareness of a broader understanding of institutions, though it was not always 
clear what level of ambition each issue area was aiming for. When asked what our initial discussions 
had triggered for Sachin Gupta, he replied ‘it’s a reminder to return to the question of ‘what is the 
systemic change that we should be working towards?’, the highest-level outcome’.  
 
This suggests a potential trade off: working with an increasingly reactionary grain may ensure survival 
and license to operate, but can easily do so at the cost of a programme reducing its commitment to 
wider societal transformation. 
 
‘Inclusive’ is a much used (and abused) word in development – what does I4ID mean by it? In 
particular, does inclusive refer to process (involving marginalized groups and their leaders in 
governance discussions) or outcome (poor people benefit from the result of reforms supported by the 
programme) or both? While aiming for both, I4ID appears to favour an outcome-oriented version of 
inclusion. The issues I4ID works on focus on specific groups (see GESI section below): people with 
disability, deaf children, waste pickers, women street vendors, out-of-school girls (MHM), and 
untenured informal residents.  
 
This discussion is crystallized in I4ID’s focus on ‘points of entry’ for it to engage in new work areas. 
These, more often than not, boil down to identifying statements from the president or senior 
politicians or officials that can open up political space to work on a particular issue (e.g. a ministry 
asking for analysis on a tariff issue, or the president publicly supporting urban street vendors in his 
home town). I4ID seems to be largely supporting work within ‘invited’ rather than ‘created’ spaces.13 
This may well be a sensible adaptation to closing political space, but working with the grain rather 
                                                             
12 The Power of Positive Deviance, R. Pascale, J. Sternin and M. Sternin, Harvard Business Press, 2010 
13 See the Power Cube site, https://www.powercube.net/ 
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than seeking to challenge or transform the grain can risk diluting the commitment to inclusion in the 
change process. Going with the grain can mean accepting the priorities and processes of 
powerholders, but can also create a chance of transforming the grain in the long term, by bringing 
citizens into the decision-making spaces. If AM is offered as at least as good as – and in this kind of 
context – better than ‘first orthodoxy’ efforts, then making clear and closely monitoring who is/is not 
benefiting and in what way will be essential.  
Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI)  
There is one senior (foreign) GESI advisor and Mwanahamisi Singano (aka Mishy), the national GESI 
coordinator, who plays three roles within her half-time post:  
 Support team ethos (having right policies/attitudes/gender pay gap) 
 Support all work streams – from conception to implementation and monitoring 
 Lead on incubating specific issues, for example currently on urban vendors and menstrual 
products (both to be handed over after incubation).  
The GESI focus shows up in Adaptive Delivery during team meetings, where Mishy probes others to 
keep their work stream on track for inclusive impact by asking three simple impact questions:  
1. Are we transforming people’s lives?  
2. Can we support maximum benefit of what they do?  
3. Can we protect them from what is happening?  
‘Transforming people’s lives’ is a broad term. GESI categories include women, very poor people, youth, 
elders on some issues, disabled people, with the group focus chosen according to the issue. For 
example, if it is access to land, young people are more likely to be excluded than older people – so 
efforts are needed to embed young people’s perspectives and needs in any land-related work. Per 
issue, an analysis is undertaken to identify which GESI groups relate to each of the three GESI impact 
questions (see above) and the power dynamics that need tackling to include excluded groups. The end 
goal will shape the degree and nature of participation of different prioritised groups.  
 
Mishy supports colleagues on a case-by-case, as people’s understanding of gender and social equity 
issues varies. Sometimes GESI is a last-minute input but in principle the issue coordinator is expected 
to start thinking about GESI outcomes from the start as it is explicit in the Issue Appraisal Forms and 
involve the foreign expert and Mishy in the thinking process. GESI is tracked with six-monthly health 
checks, based on various milestones. A ‘Do No Harm’ principle applies: even if a work stream is not 
proactively promoting gender, it must demonstrate that it does not have negative impacts on gender 
relations, dynamics or opportunities. 
 
When it comes to gender, the GESI lens is used to look at issues with a gender focus on the power 
dynamics between women and men or with a focus on women only, such as with the menstrual health 
workstream. Donors’ influence on which of these two forms is pursued has led to shifts in issue focus.  
In order to bring Irish funding into the programme, Palladium agreed to at least one gender-focused 
issue given Irish Aid’s focus on women and girls in its Tanzania strategy. Irish Aid’s investment allowed 
the project to increase its investment in GESI within the I4ID team. The workstream with Urban 
Women Vendors were initially presented as a gender issue and illustrates possible alignment tensions 
as described above: ‘‘Women urban vendors was interesting. The initial idea was a gender focus, but 
then we did a PEA for 6 months, talked to all the relevant stakeholders in Mwanza. When we showed 
the result to Irish Aid they said ‘where’s the gender gone?!’’(Mishy interview).  
 
Based on its analysis, I4ID had selected work with women and men vendors alike, whereas Irish Aid 
wanted that work stream focused on women, with the donor holding firm.   
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There is another inherent tension between the GESI ambition and AM principle of ‘going with the 
grain’, when that grain is hostile to gender equity and inclusion. In the current context, whereas 
gender rights were gaining ground under the former President, there is a new conservatism (such as 
the ban on pregnant schoolgirls and the crackdown on promoting family planning) that will influence 
what is possible or needed as far as the state is concerned. With the state pulling towards conservative 
values around inclusion, adaptive programming and delivery will need to tread a fine line if it is to 
maintain a focus on gender equity.    
 
The evolution of I4ID raises questions about the limits to ‘working with the grain’ of power when the 
political space is closing. At what point does working with the grain become incompatible with 
inclusion and/or development? When/how should AM institutions shift to working against the grain? 
How can it use a portfolio approach across its various workstreams to achieve a balance between ‘with 
the grain’ work with fewer political risks, and a few more risky ‘against the grain’ activities? There are 
no easy answers, but I4ID’s vulnerability in terms of its foreign identity, and the pressure for results 
that show system change within a relatively short life span, seems to have pushed it towards seeking 
lower risk options in response to the political shocks it has lived through, even when doing so entails 
a dilution of the initial ambition. 
Monitoring/Evaluation/Learning and Outcomes 
It is too early for a detailed discussion of I4ID’s outcomes, in the form of concrete benefits to Tanzanian 
citizens. This discussion therefore considers the emerging contours of outcomes and challenges in 
I4ID’s search for demonstrable outcomes (see Box 5), starting with its approach to monitoring, 
evaluation and learning from its work.  
 
Box 5. I4ID’s results framework 
Outcome 1: Government, civil society and the private sector collectively put into practice 
institutional arrangements that promote the common interest 
Outcome 2: Key democratic institutions have more capacity, and are more accountable and inclusive 
Output 3: Stakeholders are facilitated to coordinate better and work collectively on policy and 
institutional reforms 
Output 4: Democratic governance stakeholders and citizens meaningfully contribute to identifying 
and resolving constraints to inclusive development 
Output 5: I4ID and its partners successfully implement effective principles of adaptive programmes. 
Target tension: the intention and reality of the Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Learning (MEL) strategy 
The strategy’s guiding principles are AM-friendly: flexible, enabling, participatory, and impact-
oriented (I4ID MEL Strategy, 2018). We are not in a position to comment on whether MEL in this form 
is being effectively implemented yet or not; during our short visit we did not see MEL in action outside 
our limited interaction with some of the I4ID team. The balance between the three output areas is 
dynamic, with more initial focus on Output 3 – getting the ways of working adaptively in place, and 
moving towards Output 1. It is excellent that the project is explicit about wanting to demonstrate 
adaptation in its delivery: “creating the culture and space for adaptation to occur” and “is responsive 
to changes in the context and emerging opportunities.” 
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The emergent results framework appears sensible: “After only the first year of implementation for the 
programme, still much is being learned about what is realistically achievable in terms of political and 
citizen engagement, particularly within the changing political environment and operating context.  
This is partly envisaged in the design of the Results Framework, which allows for adaptation and 
revision, and has deliberately postponed the setting of targets for certain Outcomes and Outputs until 
implementation is more advanced.” (Annual Report 2018) To this end, as part of reflection and to 
inform revisions to the Results Framework, I4ID reported results against Output 1, demonstrating 
good adaptive delivery. 
 
Presumably reflecting high levels of trust at the design stage – and in line with the logic of AM - I4ID 
has a considerable period of grace when it comes to targets; none have been set for any of the 
outcome or output areas and they will only be agreed at the mid-point in Year 3.  
 
For Output 1 on stakeholder facilitation, work streams are the ‘unit of performance’ with numbers 
agreed in 2017-18 to encourage a quicker pace of progress, with a set number expected: two ‘low 
intensity or active’ work streams and eight work streams to have been explored.  For the two active 
workstreams, there were also agreed essential deliverables (core work), of which 90% should be 
achieved and stretch deliverables (more ambitious targets), of which 30% should be achieved. In 2018, 
as the pace with workstreams has picked up, essential deliverables were dropped as they were putting 
pressure on the project to follow specific pathways. Expected performance levels for 2018-19 were 
mutually agreed. It saw an interesting evolution to a numerical range and a menu of options: 
“Confirmed delivery of between 10 and 12 Outputs (out of a possible 31…) will constitute an A; 13 or 
more will constitute an A+.” (I4ID Results Forecast 2018-19, October 2018). This framing for 
performance allows for flexibility both quantitatively and thematically and offers a stretch goal for the 
A+ rating. Such agreements are reviewed monthly to track progress and identify emerging priority 
actions.  
 
Output 2 works similar to Output 1 but focuses on political engagement and inclusion/voice. This is 
more difficult to pin down as it in involves spotting ‘behaviours that are consistent with more inclusive 
decision-making, planning or policy process’.  
 
Output 3 on I4ID’s growth as an AM programme is tracked using a rubric, with five levels for each of 
the two indicators: creating culture and space for adaptation and responsive to changing context. The 
levels range from ‘not at all effective’ to ‘extremely effective’ with clear descriptions of what should 
be observed for all five levels. Level 5 marks the stretch goal in terms of I4ID’s own ways of working, 
with I4ID setting target levels per year – aiming for Level 4 by Year 3.  
 
Notwithstanding the relatively target-free space, the project was alarmed at receiving a B in the first 
period. The relief of the subsequent award in April 2018 of an ‘A’ grade highlights the importance of 
this donor reporting system that seeks to keep the bar high– even if it is unclear in advance how much 
progress can be made on any given issue.  
 
Two related questions are important for AM in general when it comes to MEL:  
 
1. What is good enough – and is it only about process? Donors rank achievements of key 
outcomes, such as for I4ID, ‘democratic engagement’. Given the constraining environment, 
might it be acceptable for AM programmes to simply keep open spaces or stop even worse 
things from happening? This could show as a lower ranking in the metric used to assess, for 
example, democratic engagement. Will a lower performance be acceptable to team 
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leadership and donors, if the political space tightens further? More importantly, how many 
citizens should be benefiting from each issue for it to be deemed ‘a success’?  
 
There is a real tension around a target-light backdrop that keeps pressure off an AM process 
and the real world need for people to benefit from a programme focusing on ‘inclusive 
development’. The Issue Appraisal Forms (IAF) developed after Sachin Gupta started as team 
leader are an early-stage accountability option; they offer a sense of the direction of travel 
and give an indication of possible numbers of potential beneficiaries. However, they do not 
require precision about what success will look like. Sachin Gupta summarises: “the original 
approach requiring a TOC was … overblown and over-ambitious about what you can predict 
at an early stage. The idea that you can predict your theory of change contradicts the need 
for purposive muddling to figure stuff out as you go and deepen understanding of the 
complexity.” The IAFs were developed together to be agile and yet accountability-aware. DfID 
wanted “some idea of our ‘north star’ - what we thought we could achieve, rather than a 
structured ‘theory of change’ ... so when we started articulating potential outcomes quite 
simply in the IAF they preferred that.”  An early indication of progress occurs through monthly 
updates and dashboard visibility across all approved and pre-approval workstreams. The 
detailed IAF document is only submitted at the point of approval, during update meetings that 
are otherwise light touch on approved workstreams. These happen every three months.  
 
2. How to balance reporting and reflecting?  An AM programme needs reporting for three 
reasons: upward accountability, team reflections, and sharing learning with others.  But there 
is a trade-off between creating a heavy upward reporting burden and encouraging the kind of 
(documented) reflection useful for ‘learning by doing’. At I4ID, we were struck by the vast 
amounts of upward reporting of this very young project but noted that the balance between 
reflection and this purpose for reporting was still evolving. Documentation, for use by peers 
and not necessarily upward-focus, is critical to support decision making by, for example, 
explaining why subtle adaptations were needed, raising questions about the theory of change 
or tactics, and retrospectively spotting patterns of what works or not and why. The recent 
review of various monitoring tools highlighted the reporting burden being generated. The 
team leader has been instrumental in meeting upward reporting needs by reusing existing 
working documents. The art will lie in focusing on the dialogue around any reporting and using 
it to trigger course-corrective action.  
I4ID’s Theory of Action 
I4ID was never formally an Empowerment and Accountability programme (the topic of the wider 
research programme of which this paper is part). However, the original programme ‘Theory of Change’ 
(for reasons explained above, we would refer to it as a Theory of Action) explicitly focuses on 
democratic governance and citizenship. As far as we know, these two pillars still hold. In practice, 
‘democratic governance’ has become evidence of behaviours by political and civil society stakeholders 
to be more inclusive in their decision-making planning or policy processes (I4ID Results Framework 
Oct 2018); in practice it has been about coalition building and collective action to identify and resolve 
constraints to inclusive development. Given the early days of the programme, we saw initial outputs 
– convening around new business collaboration (menstrual health), research on and support to small-
scale solid waste management, scoping of urban planning needs through the university. It is still too 
early to talk of concrete outcomes for citizens, still less of wider systemic change (although both of 
these need to be kept squarely in I4ID’s crosshairs, of course – of which the project is mindful).  
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This de facto reformulation could suggest any collective action and coalition good enough. The focus 
of change is still, however, intended to be ‘behaviour that is consistent with more inclusive decision-
making, planning or policy process’ of democratic institutions involved in the programme. Such 
institutions can include media, parliament, civil society but also electoral campaigning, policy 
processes and citizen engagement, key bureaucrats, political appointees, ministries and major 
associations (I4ID Indicator Reference Sheets, October 2018). To this end, examples of observable 
behaviours are documented through outcome harvesting to generate a chain of evidence about 
changes towards this outcome.  
Timing and Pressure for Results 
It is early days for I4ID. Despite flexibility around what the outcomes will be, the pressure is on to show 
both progress towards results and concrete results. The emerging results have been important to 
demonstrate the workstreams’ potential. One tangible result, team members say, is the very survival 
of the programme in an adverse context.  
 
The timing of I4ID’s birth could hardly have been unluckier. While the programme was still being 
designed by DFID and Palladium, a political shock was unfolding that invalidated some of I4ID’s 
founding assumptions. The focus on design of the inception phase, based on further studies and 
conversations, rather than beginning actual programming, compounded the problem – staff and DfID 
felt more early piloting could have produced more immediate and useful feedback, including insights 
into just how much the political space had shrunk.  
 
That said, the shock has also in some ways been a validation of AM: in the words of Victoria Lihiru, 
I4ID’s Democratic Governance & Strategic Partnerships Manager: ‘If we had had to stick to the original 
plan, we would have shut by now’.  
 
The difficulties of repurposing a governance programme that was still a fledgling has been exacerbated 
by the pressure for early results. Compared to I4ID, the early days of DFID’s adaptive management 
programmes in Myanmar and Nigeria enjoyed a longer period of relatively small budget, below-the-
radar experimentation to shape their teams and refine their cultures and ways of working. Often, real 
results only emerged in the second phases of projects like SAVI and Pyoe Pin. In contrast, I4ID is 
expected to show results within its five-year timeframe (which is currently a hard time horizon - no-
one spoke to us about subsequent phases), which means that as soon as the inception period was 
over, pressure started to mount. 
 
According to Harry Jones of Palladium: ‘One of the downsides of [AM’s success within the aid sector] 
is that people think it is easy to do, so funders then layer on tough processes. SAVI had 8 years and 
didn’t have to deliver any significant changes. I4ID has 5 years from zero to in theory delivering 
changes on issues AND democratic institutions.’ The risks of AM on steroids – all the difficulties (and 
opportunities) plus the challenge of inclusive development and in a compressed timeframe of 5 years 
- are significant. This short timeframe goes against the ‘second orthodoxy’ feature of long-term 
commitment and results, asking of AM what it was not set up to do.    
 
Sachin Gupta takes a different, and trenchant view: ‘Having worked on too many programmes in the 
past that drifted along, claiming “it’s all very difficult”, “the government is being very slow”, I think the 
increased accountability is actually a good thing.  No programme should work for 8 years and not have 
to deliver anything – or at least show it is developing potential and proving its theory of change.’ 
Differences exist about this pressure for (progress towards) results. Helen Barnes, DFID’s senior 
responsible officer (SRO) for the programme, argues that the donors have deliberately dropped 
targets altogether apart from holding I4ID to two ‘high intensity work streams’ and eight ‘low intensity 
work streams, all initially unspecified. Being ‘target-free’ has not let the programme off the hook. 
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There is much pressure to show evidence of progress – arguably rightly so after a lethargic start. AM 
must strike a tricky balance between enough room to try, change, scale and being accountable for 
smart and bold impact at scale.   
 
This pressure – whether intended or experienced as results or progress towards results – creates four 
potential unintended consequences that the programme is trying to manage with some delicacy and 
with varying degrees of success. Firstly, it can exacerbate the operational default of Palladium to reach 
for established, usually international, experts, rather than invest the time needed to nurture local 
capacity to become the programme’s ‘critical antennae’. Secondly, it can accentuate risk aversion, as 
the programme shied away from the politically (increasingly) difficult towards a search for politically 
easier terrain, such as market strengthening. Thirdly, the need to show (potential for impact) can 
reduce staff appetite for risk and focusing on those issues where impact is feasible, and it is unclear if 
there is the time to ‘learn by failing’. Several staff did share the hesitation they felt – when in the room 
with donors– at putting forward more risky ideas that might be shot down.  
Finally, it requires balancing the quick wins needed to catch up for lost time that both build morale 
and momentum, and keeping the project focused on impact at scale and the donors happy. This search 
for ‘low hanging fruit’ makes sense and is a standard part of many influencing strategies. But if it 
becomes an over-riding priority, it can displace a search for more profound, systemic change, and can 
lead to taking too much credit for victories, which can alienate and undermine local partnerships – 
and thus damage a crucial aspect of long-term Adaptive Management strategies.  
 
I4ID was allowed a long leash in these initial years in terms of issue selection – with much discussion 
as to whether this is working as an approach. Issues selected for donor approval tend to reflect the 
expertise and networks of specific staff members – market systems, menstrual products, disability and 
education, sunflower seeds being clear examples. AM needs networks and expertise so laying an 
important foundation for progress. However, this feature of the approved workstreams is different 
from starting with a blank sheet of paper and using different criteria to select priority issues, e.g. based 
on scale of impact. Time will tell whether this matters.       
 
Yet there is a marked lack of consensus on its workstreams. For each issue (except MHM), we heard 
at least one person seriously doubt its merits – whether frontline staff, team leadership or donors. For 
example, one donor doubted the wisdom of focusing on solid waste management: “it is a blinder that 
I4ID has put on themselves not seeing the vested interests in SWM – it’s not just a coordination 
problem. You only get that if you’re integrated, and Tanzanian. SWM is a cartel and there will be a real 
fight.” Doubts were also expressed to us about the disability education work, the urban planning work 
and sunflower work. Such pervasive disquiet sits uneasily alongside the conviction needed to invest a 
substantial amount in an issue. In-depth knowledge is needed to get to the level of details that matter 
- networks, issue knowledge, legislation. Will doubts prevail over the long-term view - and if so, whose 
doubts count most: donor, leadership, or frontline staff?   
The MEL Toolbox and Learning Culture 
I4ID has been actively experimenting with a range of tracking and learning tools that guide AD14. A 
recent review of the tools (source: undated/untitled mimeo review of 5 tools, I4ID) noted that several 
were cumbersome and only effective if consistently applied. Processes have been repurposed in 
response to feedback and learning what does/doesn’t work. The focus of weekly all-staff meetings 
now alternates between updates/ reviews, and proposals for work on new issues. When staff found 
Quarterly Reviews an ordeal, rather than a place to share doubts and failures, another meeting was 
added, the Participatory Reflection and Review Meeting, so that frank conversations could be had by 
the team without the donors.   
                                                             
14 Notably contact lists, weekly update, routine monitoring, issue appraisals, principles-focused monitoring. 
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The MEL strategy makes explicit both outward-facing and inward-facing learning strategies. Externally 
there is a strong focus on how the external world (in-country and foreign) can learn about AM from 
I4ID: “to help them understand how to work in a problem-driven, politically smart way” (I4ID Learning 
Agenda) and focused “lessons on the significance of institutions, coalitions and collective action for 
achieving change” (ibid) for sector and issue audiences anywhere.  
 
The priority for sharing a long overdue I4ID political analysis is external in the form of a single “updated 
PEA overview, to be published as an ODI working paper, including the assessment of the political 
settlement, and implications (broadly) for promoting inclusive development in Tanzania” (I4ID 
Learning Strategy Aug 2018). But does this emphasis on external learning squeeze out internal 
learning? Political analysis by the team takes place daily, weekly, monthly. The challenge is of course 
to manage both. How can I4ID maximise the learning that occurs in a daily ‘PEA’ dynamic of a politically 
savvy team with the more static form of a single PEA paper written by ODI?  
 
One absence noted by the I4ID team is donor learning - to what extent has DfID learned from an overly 
extended inception period and the downsides for results - or focusing the full team energy on ‘the ToC 
agony and asking for ever-more details. If AM is to work well, then the organisations involved in the 
adaptive governance part need to actively learn as much as frontline staff (AD) and team leadership 
(AP).  
Conclusion  
This study complements the other two papers in this series, on Pyoe Pin in Myanmar, and PERL in 
Nigeria, in three important ways: firstly, it confirms, and further elaborates, the value of subdividing 
the broad concept of ‘adaptive management’ into its component parts – adaptive governance, 
programming and delivery. Doing so creates a way of better understanding the dynamics and 
interactions between donors, managers and frontline staff that go into creating (or frustrating) efforts 
to manage adaptively. This short foray into a young programme focused on adaptive governance due 
to the limited lifespan and the limited time to immerse ourselves into the daily ins and outs of adaptive 
programming and delivery. Any future review should take more time to look at the approaches and 
tactics that bring I4ID to life: how different frontline staff do their problem analysis, how they spot 
opportunities and work with team members and stakeholders to create pathways of influence, how 
they bat back daily obstacles and grab sudden opportunities, and how they manage both to delicately 
work ‘with the grain’ and push against it.  
 
Secondly, whereas Pyoe Pin and PERL are the result of over a decade of experimentation and learning, 
I4ID is still an infant, and something of a test tube baby at that. Seeing how it copes and struggles 
provides useful insights into what can be expected in the initial months and years of an Adaptive 
Management programme.  
 
Thirdly, it shows how a fledgling AM programme responds to a serious political shock that forced it to 
rethink its approach, which would probably have been impossible in a more rigidly designed 
programme. 
 
The way I4ID responded to that shock was shaped by its initial design. In our view, one feature 
damaged its ability to respond creatively to an extremely difficult situation – the lack of deep 
Tanzanian roots in terms of staff or analysis. Absent the shock, it might have been able to develop 
such roots. Unfortunately, the premature shock meant that it did not have that luxury, and the result 
was a response that was more chaotic and more cautious than might otherwise have been the case. 
One significant question raised by this study is a question mark over the widely accepted idea of 
‘working with the grain’. When the grain is becoming increasingly excluding and unjust, at what point 
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should a programme committed to inclusive development switch to working against the grain, and 
how can it go about doing so? 
 
Finally, the I4ID case raises questions about what might happen when a new approach becomes 
codified and, to some extent, a new orthodoxy. Codification can slide into standardization, with a 
blueprint created outside the context of political time and place and the loss of some of the features 
most likely to make the approach effective in the first place. Our conclusion is that the Adaptive 
Management ‘movement’ needs to beware such a step and recover the full features of the approach. 
It needs to return to a greater emphasis on localizing programme design and leadership in the local 
context.  
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